part of the norms of society and so did not stand out. Women lawyers, however, did remember discrimination but the origin of this was one specific Dean of the Law School at the University of Manitoba from 1945–64. Perhaps because the discrimination was so personalized rather than institutionalized it remained a sore spot for many.

Nursing and teaching really were different from the other three professions. The numbers involved allowed nurses and teachers to form organizations to represent them. In the case of nurses, this was not always easy since divisions between university-trained nurses and hospital-trained nurses emerged. In the case of teachers, the women split off from the general teaching association to mount a more sustained campaign against inequities. What they were most concerned about was pay differential. Interestingly enough, they did not seem particularly perturbed by the prohibition on married women teaching which remained in existence until 1946.

What unites most of the women in these five professions is the consensus that their priority was family; their profession came second. Not surprisingly, this meant that in law and medicine many women felt they could not have both career and family, although a significant number of single women physicians adopted children. Nursing with its "flexible" shift work allowed married women to continue working. Also nursing with its image of nurturing did not seem to contradict the decision to became a mother. Teaching, however, was different due to the legal prohibition against married women. But when that prohibition was rescinded they were there. Having withdrawn from the work force to have their family did not disqualify them for reentry, which certainly would have been the case in medicine, law, and even university teaching.

What Kinnear has demonstrated in *In Subordination* is the variation in women's 'professional' experience, a variation which was probably much greater than for their male colleagues.

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## ENDNOTE

1. Penina Migdal Glazer and Miriam Slater, *Unequal Colleagues: The Entrance of Women into the Professions, 1891–1940* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1987).

REVIEWS

*Naissance du chômeur 1880–1910*. By Christian Topalov (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994. 626pp.).

Historians are turning increasingly to metaphors of birth, invention, and construction to connote the centrality to the historical project of studies of the creation, dissemination, legitimation and eventual naturalization and assimilation of fundamentally new ways of conceptualizing and organizing experience. When attached to something to which common sense attributes a kind of ahistorical permanence, these terms are telltale signs of a work of "new cultural history," as surely as the subtitle "class and community" was of a new social history study a generation ago.[1] While new social histories showed how classes and

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communities came into being as the result of large-scale sociological processes and came to consciousness of their ability to affect these processes, "birth" studies generally eschew such narratives in favor of the complicated creation and negotiation of identities and conceptual delineations as exercises of power by both social authorities and those whom they seek to classify. Exemplary in this genre are Michel Foucault's genealogy of the criminal and Judith Walkowitz's study of the creation and imposition of the legal category of the prostitute against the norms and practices of the poor in Victorian England.[2] Christian Topalov's excellent study of the "birth" of the unemployed in France, Great Britain, and the United States in the decades before World War I reveals once again what the new cultural history project has to offer.

*Naissance du chômeur* is far from the first major historical study of unemployment. Reviewing briefly a few other histories of the subject, we can see what sets apart Topalov's account. John Burnett's *Idle Hands: The Experience of Unemployment, 1790–1990*, seeks to capture "the experience" of unemployment as recorded primarily in workers' memoirs.[3] He finds the concept of unemployment to be unproblematic—"It is not too difficult to arrive at a commonsense meaning of the term which carries general acceptance" (p 3)—and assumes that a single definition can be used to organize and give meaning to workers' experience over two centuries. The problem faced by a reader of Burnett's study is that the meanings and definitions of being without a job themselves have histories which it is impossible to extricate from recountings or analysis of "the experience of unemployment."

The best social history of unemployment to date is Alexander Keyssar's pathbreaking *Out of Work: The First Century of Unemployment in Massachusetts*.[4] Keyssar places the origins of modern unemployment within a narrative of economic and social change. He is more concerned with the changing problems which being out of work raised for workers than with the problems which delineating and conceptualizing unemployment posed for bureaucrats and social scientists. Yet, while Burnett's methodology leads him to interpret unemployment as a series of comparable individual experiences, Keyssar rightly understands unemployment to be an analyzable, quantifiable, chronologically located sociological phenomenon, with a history that differs from a cumulation of life stories.

Finally, we turn to John Garraty's acclaimed *Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy*.[5] On the surface, Garraty's project resembles Topalov's. Garraty eschews a social history of unemployment for a study "of how the idea 'unemployment' has been understood and evaluated, both before and after the term itself was invented" (p. xi) at the end of the nineteenth century. Yet this similarity is only apparent: Garraty's sense that the idea of "unemployment" has long been with us lends itself to a "history of ideas" interpretation in the tradition of A. O. Lovejoy which differs radically from Topalov's "birth" study. Garraty combines this belief in a core idea inherited from the past with a belief in a social reality waiting to be found by economists and social scientists. The chapter of *Unemployment in History* which covers the period Topalov discusses is tellingly entitled not the "birth," but "the discovery of unemployment"—the Hegelian moment when the appearance of the term "unemployment" and the revelation of a corresponding social reality came together.

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There is a second and equally important way in which Garraty's and Topalov's studies differ. Garraty's history of an idea focuses on discrete accounts of thinkers with the most to contribute to the narrative of a fuller and more complete understanding of the idea of unemployment. Topalov is primarily concerned with the political and social struggles among individuals and groups to define, classify, and treat the "unemployed." Social and legal identities are never simply the product of better observation of social phenomena or clearer thinking about them, but of contests over who has the power to determine and impose their understandings of these social phenomenon. Therefore, the perceptive writings of the outsider economist John A. Hobson receive more sustained attention in Garraty's study than in Topalov's much longer and much more chronologically limited work. From Garraty's perspective of discussing figures in the past who raised issues and questions which help us to put together a logical progression to our contemporary understanding of unemployment, a focus on Hobson is crucial; in Topalov's problematic, Hobson's marginality—no matter how perceptive he was—renders him a secondary figure.

Topalov's study differs radically from those of Burnett, Keyssar, and Garraty. He argues that the twentieth-century idea of the unemployed was not the direct product of either economic crisis or of the development of a theory of periodic depressions, but of a crisis in the mechanisms of social representation based on the individual and moral systems of classification which private charities had used to guide their actions in the nineteenth century. The opportunity for change occurred not because these mechanisms were internally contradictory—they always had been—but because the potential for shifts in the exercise of social, economic, cultural, and political power at the end of the nineteenth century allowed new understandings of society, of the possibilities for social action, and of systems of social representation to come into play.

In the late 1880s, Charles Booth broke with the dominant paradigm by explaining unemployment as due only secondarily to undeserving individuals and primarily to the casual labor market. Others, culminating most famously with William Beveridge, developed the idea of structural unemployment, a social fact independent of whatever moral characteristics might be ascribed to the unemployed. This much can be found in any history of unemployment. Two elements differentiate Topalov's book—and make it a "new cultural history."

First, Topalov's careful study of the tortuous development of the modern concept of the unemployed and in particular of widespread resistance to use of the term by those who believed classification of the jobless required individual moral evaluations make clear that neither the particular meanings which the concept had nor its widespread acceptance were foregone conclusions (as in the "discovery" model). Development, dissemination, and legitimation of the concept were the result of conflicts and compromises among unions, philanthopists, social reformers, bureaucrats, social scientists, and other interested groups. Shifts in the balances of power among such groups in the three nations affected these developments and created different opportunities for the conceptualization and implementation of state reform in the decade before World War I.

Second, the "birth" of the unemployed was inseparable from the quest for ways to measure and represent them. In the past, histories of statistics have generally been predicated on the idea that over time statistical measures have been devel-

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oped to determine social phenomena more accurately; "new cultural histories" argue that statistics themselves contribute to constituting what they measure. And, in turn, measures of unemployment took the forms they did because they were the product of various state reform projects which became conceivable at different times in the three nations. While measurement of unemployment in terms of those who qualify for state unemployment benefits in states with such programs is an obvious example, one of Topalov's most interesting sections concerns the development of unemployment indices based on unemployment statistics the state encouraged unions to collect (although the unions' understanding of unemployment differed significantly from that of state officials). As reformers began to consider the possibility of using counter-cyclical spending to reduce unemployment, they used compilations of these "faulty" statistics to create serviceable retrospective unemployment indices to reveal trends which could be used to guide government action. In sum, systems of unemployment insurance were not born of insights derived from analysis of the kind of statistics available today; identification of the "unemployed" and statistical measures of unemployment were, on the contrary, the fruit of these state reform projects. The contemporary notion of the unemployed was created by reform policies which were in turn only conceivable and defensible in terms of this new conception of the unemployed.

In concluding, one is tempted to apply the kind of "new cultural history" criteria Topalov uses to his own study. The French historical and sociological community is far less roiled by debates over race and gender than their British and American counterparts. While Topalov's account does not concentrate on France—Great Britain is the primary focus—the book's failure to examine the way in which conceptions of gender and, especially in the United States, race, functioned in the delineation of social categories like the unemployed clearly reflects its origins.

Topalov has written what in the United States would be considered a "new cultural history," in which ideas and categories are the product of intellectual projects, social conflicts, and reform politics and in turn offer possibilities for the reorientation of laws, state policy, social identity and social movements. To find that things we thought were always there or at least were the fruit of a long social, political, or intellectual evolution had births and were the product of the dismantling of old categories and the construction of new ones suggests that while we can never have unmediated access to social reality, we can, if we are conscious about the ways in which the categories of analysis we use have been constructed, begin to think our way out of the conundrums in which dependence upon them may place us.

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## ENDNOTES

1. Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, 1989). It should be pointed out that Topalov has probably never thought of himself as a "new cultural historian," although the journal with which he is associated, *Genèses* (another birth metaphor) shares many of the concerns of the new cultural history.

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2. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1979). Judith Walkowtiz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State* (Cambridge, 1980).

3. John Burnett, *Idle Hands: The Experience of Unemployment, 1790–1990* (New York, 1994).

4. Alexander Keyssar, *Out of Work: The First Century of Unemployment in Massachusetts* (Cambridge, 1986).

5. John A. Garraty, *Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy* (New York, 1978).

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*'Die Manie der Revolte': Protest unter der Französischen Julimonarchie (1830–1848)*. By Werner Giesselmann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993. xiii plus 1,086pp.).

German historical sociologist Werner Giesselmann's massive study of social protest under the July Monarchy is a self-conscious attempt to swim against the tide of most recent research in social history. At a time when most scholars have abandoned large-scale quantification and hypothesis-testing approaches modelled after those of the natural sciences, Giesselmann has undertaken a computerized analysis of 110,423 protest incidents in France between July 1830 and February 1848, with the aim of providing empirical tests of a wide variety of social science theories about the origins of protest. His study challenges some widely held assumptions about social protest in this period, but the limited scope of his conclusions unavoidably raises the question frequently posed by lengthy statistical studies: are the results worth the heavy investment of time and effort?

Giesselmann bases his study on the *Compte général de l'administration de la Justice criminelle*, a series of annual published reports begun in 1826. His definition of protest is "any individual or collective form of aggression due to social causes that violated existing law and threatened public order and had the function of expressing dissatisfactions and promoting interests caused by social conditions." (p. 12) In contrast to Charles Tilly, whose statistical studies of protest in France are one of Giesselmann's principal targets for revision, his study is not limited to outbreaks involving group action. Giesselmann argues that the Tilly approach unjustifiably overstresses organized mass actions and ignores a variety of incidents, ranging from assassination attempts on the king to violations of forest regulations, that were carried out by individuals or small groups but that nonetheless reflected hostility to the existing social order.

The first half of Giesselmann's work describes the kaleidoscopic variety of protest under the July Monarchy. He reminds us that the regime faced many kinds of protests besides workers' strikes and republican uprisings. Protests, including rural defenses of common rights, the legitimist uprising in the west in 1832, tax revolts, resistance to the 1841 census and to emergency measures against the spread of cholera, and student demonstrations, were a part of the period's daily life. They were most frequent in the early 1830s, as the newly installed regime struggled to stabilize itself in the midst of a major economic crisis; the simultaneous legitimist uprising in the west and the huge republican

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